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By
William A. Rugh
When Americans became
aware that the prestige of the United States after 9/11 had
declined seriously in the Arab world, many called for an intensified
public diplomacy effort in the Middle East in order to reverse
that decline. Reacting to that concern, the Broadcasting Board
of Governors, which is responsible for US Government-sponsored
international broadcasting, developed two new projects intended
to help explain America better to the Arab public. One of them
was Radio Sawa, an Arabic language radio channel that the BBG
started 2002, and which replaced the Voice of America's Arabic
Service, and the other was Alhurra Television, also in Arabic,
which the BBG started in February 2004.
The BBG intended Radio Sawa to target the 15-30 age cohort in
the Arab world, and in order to appeal to that group, the program
content was primarily American and Arab pop music, interspersed
with periodic brief news bulletins. Congress gave Radio Sawa
$100 million in startup funding. In order to improve access,
the Broadcasting Board of Governors enhanced Sawa's signal on
medium wave by shifting the use of some transmitters, and also
arranged for leases on several local FM channels in Arab countries.
Alhurra was intended to reach a general audience by satellite
and its sponsors said it would offer programs that would demonstrate
American democracy and deal with issues that it said had been
avoided by all Arab TV channels. Congress gave Alhurra $102
million in startup funding.
Now that both Radio Sawa and Alhurra television have been in
operation for some time, it seems clear that both have shortcomings.
There are several problems with Radio Sawa. First, its sponsors
claim that it is successful because it has developed a significant
audience share in the Arab world. However to be effective in
supporting American public diplomacy, audience share is not
enough. Radio Sawa is giving the young Arabs the programs they
want, namely pop music, but the station does little to advance
public diplomacy objectives, which include improving understanding
and appreciation of American society and foreign policies. The
Voice of America Arabic Service that Radio Sawa replaced presented
a broad spectrum of programming including extensive news reports
and analyses, features on American culture and society including
on current issues, and in-depth background pieces that helped
Arab audiences understand America better. Radio Sawa does none
of that, so those programs are now lost. Moreover, VOA Arabic
appealed to many age groups and types of listeners, including
policy makers and influential professionals, while Radio Sawa
only aims at youth and is only of interest to them.
Supporters of Radio Sawa claim that its transmissions are audible
to more people and that few Arabs could hear VOA. There was
some truth in that, because much of VOA's transmitter power
was in short wave, and the medium wave and FM frequencies that
most people now listen to were simply not available. Also the
VOA audience had declined because of the growth of both FM and
satellite TV. But VOA management was trying to address that
problem. In 2001 it had a $15 million plan to implement a major
transmitter expansion at an annual cost of $4 million that could
have included FM leases and provided 24/7 service. VOA had already
boosted the Kuwait medium wave transmitter from 100 to 600 KW
in 1996, and they planned to boost the medium wave transmitter
on Rhodes from 300 to 600KW. But the BBG shut down the Arabic
Service on April 19, 2002 before those plans could be carried
out.
Alhurra also has several problems. Its sponsors have succeeded
in obtaining substantial funding from Congress by claiming that
existing Arab television channels are hopelessly anti-American
and in addition are all so tightly controlled by Arab governments
that no sensitive issues are ever aired. The BBG argument is
that in order for the US to fight terrorism we must promote
democracy and a free press in the Arab world, and the best way
to do that is to establish an American-style TV channel based
on American principles of free press, and that competition will
force the Arab channels to open up.
The premise of that argument is incorrect and the performance
of Alhurra does not meet that standard. Professor Marc Lynch
in his well-researched essay in the book Engaging the Arab
and Muslim Worlds through Public Diplomacy has amply demonstrated
the falsity of the BBG premise. He has shown what Arab viewers
know, that Arab television channels have for some years taken
up issues that are very sensitive politically and deal openly
and frankly with Arab social and cultural taboos. As for Alhurra's
performance, testimony by Arab viewers of the channel found
that it is far from liberal in its programming but in fact it
looks much more like the old-style Arab TV channels that were
totally controlled by authoritarian Arab governments and that
served primarily as propaganda arms of those governments.
For example, when the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, Alhurra essentially
featured commentators friendly to the US Government, while Al
Jazeera broadcast the Senate hearings that featured Richard
Clarke and other critics of the administration, and the latter
was much more effective public diplomacy. Another example was
that in March 2004 when Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was killed by the
Israelis, Alhurra gave it very brief coverage and ignored most
of the reaction in the Middle East, putting a cooking show on
instead. Al Jazeera and other Arab channels in contrast not
only covered the funeral but broadcast interviews with Israelis
and Americans as well as with Palestinians, programs that appealed
to the audience and also showed balance.
When Alhurra began, Arab viewers expected a great deal from
it and they were deeply disappointed because the quality of
the programs was poorer than the quality of Arab satellite TV.
The quality has improved somewhat but it is still below standard
and well below what audiences expect from a channel sponsored
by the government of the world's only superpower.
In fact, Alhurra faces an existential dilemma. Because of its
government funding and Congressional oversight, Alhurra must
be careful not to go too far in presenting views critical of
the US Government, but at the same time it must regularly include
a fair amount of open discussion of American foreign policy
if it is to compete with Al Jazeera and other Arab channels.
It is not clear how it can it do that over the long term. For
the time being, however, the Broadcasting Board of Governors
has been able to avoid that dilemma because members of Congress
do not in fact know what is being broadcast on Alhurra except
what the BBG wants to tell them. Members of Congress and their
staffs know no Arabic, they do not watch Alhurra, and they have
no independent means to monitor it. So far, that ignorance has
allowed the BBG to obtain generous funding from Congress.
When the BBG presents opinion poll data to Congress, the data
is accurate but misleading. The polls do not show Alhurra or
Radio Sawa in head-to-head competitions, but only ask whether
audiences have watched the programs. Arab viewers and listeners
asked if they have watched Alhurra or listened to Radio Sawa
this week will probably answer yes even if have only watched
or listened for one minute, while devoting most of their time
to other channels. A much better test of audience penetration
would be to ask which channel the audience prefers. Moreover,
as was pointed out in the Congressionally-mandated study "Changing
Minds, Winning Peace," issued in October 2003 by a group
of experts headed by Ambassador Djerejian, if the purpose of
public diplomacy is to change opinions ("move the needle"),
questions probing the questions need to be asked about the impact
of these new channels on opinion change, and this has not been
done.
It is likely however that despite these shortcomings, Alhurra
and Radio Sawa will survive. That is so because Congress feels
under great pressure to "do something" about America's
serious public diplomacy problem in the Arab world, and supporting
Alhurra and Radio Sawa seems to them like a simple remedy, if
not a quick fix. There are no other simple and appealing options
on the table. And since members of Congress, like Senator Biden
(D-Delaware), who enthusiastically support it have no way of
monitoring these programs directly, all they know about them
is what they hear from people with a vested interest in more
funding. When Senator Biden and others visited the Alhurra production
studios they were dazzled by state-of-the-art equipment, and
by the fact that the staff members are native speakers of Arabic,
so they decided that the programs "must be good."
Without any real independent oversight by knowledgeable people,
these efforts will continue, whether they are worth the cost
or not.
There are, however, alternatives. Voice of America professionals
have called for the revival of the VOA Arabic Service, and they
are right to do so because effective public diplomacy needs
serious broad-spectrum radio programming that appeals to a variety
of different groups including policy makers. Moreover, instead
of denouncing Al Jazeera, American officials should try to make
much more use of all of the existing Arab television channels
that are willing to give them access, so that they can get their
policies and views out to the Arab public. Ignoring or boycotting
these channels as they have done is self-defeating, and denouncing
them reinforces the impression that America follows a double
standard, opposing free speech only when it hurts. That is the
wrong message to send.
William A.
Rugh was a US Foreign Service Officer 1964-1995, serving
in Washington and at seven Middle Eastern diplomatic posts including
public affairs officer in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. From 1995
until 2003 he was President and CEO of AMIDEAST and he is currently
an Associate of Georgetown's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,
an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute, a Trustee of
the American University in Cairo, and a Board Member at AMIDEAST.
Rugh holds a PhD in political science from Columbia University
and has taught graduate level courses on Public Diplomacy and
on US Policy in the Middle East. He is the author of Arab
Mass Media and editor of Engaging with the Arab and Islamic
Worlds Through Public Diplomacy: A Report and Action Recommendations.
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