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By
William Merrifield
Since
its inception, mass media in its various forms (newspapers,
radio, television, etc.) has been used as both a tool of nation-states
as well as a weapon against them. The power of the press to
influence opinion and help interpret reality for its constituents
has created conflict over what constitutes freedom of the press
as well as what role the state should play in providing for
or curtailing that freedom. Historically, the equipment needed
to produce most mass media (printing presses, radio towers,
television antennas, etc.) and the state's role in controlling
the issuing of media licenses helped create an environment where
the majority of state/media conflicts were addressed within
the physical boundaries of the sovereign state. As a result,
individual states retained the power to censor the media within
its own borders through a variety of techniques (oppression
and jailing of local journalists, physical destruction of printing
presses or broadcast antennas, outlawing distribution, establishing
and enforcing laws, etc.).
Relatively recently,
the emergence of satellite television and the Internet has challenged
the power of the sovereign state and introduced new components
into the relationship between the state and the media. The development
of these technologies has created effective channels for the
distribution of media that can operate outside of the borders,
laws, and policies of a single sovereign state. Satellite television,
in particular, has the ability to reach a wide literate, non-literate,
computer savvy, and non-computer savvy audience. Perhaps one
of the clearest examples of the issues raised with the emergence
of satellite technology is the case of the Kurdish peoples of
Turkey and the history of MED-TV, the first Kurdish satellite
television station. By examining what happened as a result of
the emergence of MED-TV in 1995 and its subsequent closing in
1999, I want to explore how satellite television has changed
the relationships between nation-states, how economics and sources
of funding affect virtual nationalism, and what role transnational
broadcasting plays in contributing to globalization.
Since 1918, the international
borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria have divided the land
in which Kurds live. The Kurdish nationalist movement began
in the 1960s and '70s. Its aim was the establishment of a Kurdish
nation-state for the 20 to 25 million Kurds throughout the world.
In the 1980s and '90s Turkey aggressively tried to eliminate
the Kurdish separatist movement, without success, leading to
the rise of the PKK, as well as the migration of a number of
Turkish Kurds to Western Europe. The presence of these new emigrants,
as well as news about the guerrilla war in Turkey, worked as
a catalyst for Kurdish ethnic self-awareness among Kurds already
residing in Europe. This new Kurdish self-identity among an
educated and wealthy Kurdish diaspora led to the development
of a number of cultural activities, including the revival of
the Kurdish language as a vehicle for political and literary
discourse, the founding of Kurdish institutes, and the establishment
of MED-TV, the world's first Kurdish satellite television station,
licensed in Britain with studios in Brussels, Berlin, and Stockholm.
Thus, "The Kurdish institutes, Kurdish print media and
Kurdish language courses that operate in Western Europe, largely
impervious to control by the Turkish State, have provided the
Kurdish movement with instruments of nation building comparable
to those traditionally employed by states."
After failing to
achieve self-rule after years of armed struggle in Turkey, Iran,
Iraq and Syria, many Kurds viewed the establishment of MED-TV
in 1995 as achieving "sovereignty in the sky." MED-TV
was granted a ten-year license in 1994 by the UK Independent
Television Commission (ITC) and began test transmissions in
March 1995. The Kurdish Foundation Trust, which provided financial
assistance for MED-TV, stated the following aims:
To assist in the development of the cultural identity of the
Kurdish people and the Kurdish language throughout the world;
to establish, promote and maintain media facilities and resources
to educate and inform Kurdish people; and to work for the relief
of poverty and suffering amongst the Kurdish people.
Thus, MED-TV's agenda
sought to undo the Turkish state's seven-decade-long policy
of repressing Kurdish identity. Whereas the Turkish state had
forbidden the teaching of the Kurdish language, MED-TV broadcast
a classroom setting where children could learn their native
tongue. Three newscasts a day (two in Kurdish and one in Turkish)
provided a Kurdish interpretation of major events as an alternative
to Turkish state-run broadcasts. Cultural programming and talk
shows provided a platform for discussion on a number of issues
that had previously been banned under Turkish censorship. The
channel also included the Kurdish flag and national anthem as
a part of its broadcasts. By operating under the protection
of European civil liberties, MED-TV was able to achieve a freedom
for the expression of Kurdish identity that had been denied
under the application of the Turkish law. Media watch groups
and human rights activists hailed the establishment of MED-TV
as "a defeat of political censorship."
Turkey's response
to MED-TV was varied. The state implemented a variety of internal
and external activities aimed at shutting down the station.
At its core, MED-TV challenged Turkish state sovereignty outright.
Under the Turkish constitution one of the "fundamental
aims and duties of the state is to safeguard the indivisibility
of the country." MED-TV provided a direct challenge to
the Kemalist aim of building a nation-state based on Turkish
ethnonationalism. The presence of the Kurdish national flag
and anthem in MED-TV broadcasts addressed Kurds not as an audience
but as citizens of a Kurdish state, a state that appeared on
MED-TV's maps of Turkey as Kurdistan.
Internally, the Turkish
state engaged in the smashing of satellite dishes, the intimidation
of viewers, dish vendors, dish installers, etc., as well as
cutting off electricity from villages and small towns during
prime time hours when MED-TV was on the air. The state held
the threat of prosecuting advertisers who might buy airtime
on the channel, considered illegal in Turkey, thereby limiting
MED-TV's ability to collect revenues through advertising. MED-TV's
initial satellite provider required audiences to adjust their
dishes to an angle different from Turkey's satellite channels.
This allowed police to detect viewers, resulting in more violence
against them and eventually led MED-TV to change its provider
as a way to protect its viewers. Finally, when Turkey jammed
MED-TV's signal, preventing its reception from the Eutel-sat
transponder, it represented a first in the history of satellite
broadcasting.
Externally, Turkey applied diplomatic pressure in an effort
to get its European counterparts to shutdown MED-TV. A report
in the BBC stated that "the Turkish government has brought
pressure on any country which leases airtime to MED-TV."
MED-TV reported that "certain companies supplying satellite
space breached their contracts with MED-TV because of their
own country's political stance." As a result, MED-TV had
to regularly change its satellite transmission arrangements.
Turkey accused MED-TV of being a mouthpiece and a front for
the "terrorist" PKK (a claim MED-TV strongly denied)
and called for European countries to shutdown the channel. In
response to Turkey's accusations, the offices of MED-TV were
raided and searched in Belgium and London in 1996. There were
no subsequent charges or arrests. In 1999, the ITC revoked MED-TV's
license citing "four broadcasts which included inflammatory
statements encouraging acts of violence in Turkey and elsewhere"
The ITC stated that the decision "was made purely on legal
grounds." Supporters of MED-TV protested that the ITC caved
into pressure from the Turkish authorities.
The events surrounding
the establishment, operation, and shutdown of MED-TV shed light
on the changing relationship between the media and sovereign
states and whether or not satellite television truly represents
the possibility of a greater freedom for the media. It reveals
the importance of satellite broadcasts as economic trade routes
in the sky, subject to the influence of nation-states, but operating
outside of the physical boundaries of the state. It demonstrates
the power of virtual nationalism and the challenge that it brings
to the sovereign state, as well as the difficulties of sustaining
a virtual nationalism. Finally, MED-TV's seeking refuge in Europe
created a conflict between Turkey's national priorities and
Europe's definition of civil liberties. This provided a means
for bringing Kurdish issues to an international stage and ultimately
led to changes in Turkey.
Not only did MED-TV
need a license to broadcast to varied Kurdish populations, it
needed access to a satellite that could broadcast into Turkey
and other Kurdish regions. Satellites and their orbits are owned
and therefore subject to both economic and political factors.
Whoever controls these orbits, what Monroe Price calls "satellite
trade routes," controls access to nation-states across
traditional borders. To date, there is no international consensus
on the rules that should guide the establishment of trade routes
in the sky. The complexity involved in the ownership of these
trade routes influences the types of media that are broadcast
into particular regions. Three of the factors that affect the
distribution of information via satellite around the world are
"the complexity of corporate structures, the intricate
relationship between business ventures and governments in the
satellite field, and the controlled accessibility of contracts
for the transmission of program services."
In the case of MED-TV,
the selection of a satellite trade route was a tricky issue.
The channel needed to choose a route that would involve the
least possible intervention by the Turkish authorities. Its
initial choice, Hotbird, required viewers in Turkey to turn
their dishes in a conspicuous way, leading to persecution by
the government. To protect its viewers, MED-TV shifted to Eutelsat.
However, this change had legal and political consequences. Eutelsat
was owned by a cooperative of state entities and therefore subject
to Turkish political influence. This influence played a major
role in getting MED-TV shutdown. Although Turkey was unable
to control MED-TV by means of the traditional powers of a sovereign
state within its own borders, the factors that influenced MED-TV's
choice of a particular satellite trade route ultimately enabled
Turkey to use its diplomatic powers against MED-TV to achieve
its end.
MED-TV represents
a major step in the use of media for the advancement of virtual
nationalism as a challenge to the nation-state. Some analysts
today suggest that globalization increasingly is rendering the
state irrelevant not only as an economic actor, but also as
social and cultural container. MED-TV was able to use virtual
space, through the medium of television, to fortify, build,
and help root Kurdish cultural and social identity outside of
the direct control of the Turkish state. This directly challenged
the cultural agenda of the Turkish state. In order to create
this virtual nationalism, however, MED-TV was required to submit
itself to a separate political constraint, namely the civil
laws of the UK's ITC.
On the one hand,
MED-TV's use of the civil liberties of Britain to obtain a license
for broadcasting provided the station a certain amount of protection.
In spite of Turkey's pressure on the British Government to shut
down the station, London stated that "it (could) not do
anything to stop the station from broadcasting unless it either
(broke) British law or contravened its broadcasting license."
On the other hand, MED-TV submitted itself to the ITC's requirements
for broadcasting, which required "impartiality" and
called for avoiding any broadcasts that would be "likely
to encourage or incite to crime or lead to disorder." The
definition of what type of broadcast constitutes a violation
of these acts is subject to the opinion of the commission. Turkey,
unable to use traditional state methods of censorship, took
advantage of the UK's broadcasting laws to argue that MED-TV
was a mouthpiece of the PKK, and therefore biased. When Turkey
arrested the leader of the PKK in 1999, Turkey presented the
ITC with a transcript of MED-TV's screening of live interviews
in which Kurdish leaders urged people to take action against
the Turkish government. This led to ITC's revoking of MED-TV's
broadcasting license on "legal grounds."
One of the main difficulties
encountered in MED-TV's virtual nationalism was the raising
of revenue. The cost of running a satellite television station
traditionally has made it difficult for non-state or non-business
groups to have access to the medium. Added to the high costs
of running the station was MED-TV's inability to raise advertising
revenue. Two problems prevented it from selling airtime. First,
the absence of a Kurdish state meant that MED-TV's audience
did not form a single market in spite of its large viewing audience.
Second, as mentioned before, Turkey would prosecute Turkish
advertisers who might buy airtime on the channel. As a result,
MED-TV's main sources of income came from donations from the
European Kurdish diaspora. This opened MED-TV up to Turkey's
claims that these sources of revenue were raised through unlawful
means. Whether or not MED-TV raised its revenues through lawful
means, the problems it encountered represent the difficulty
of financially sustaining a virtual nationalism. Advertising
still requires appealing to customers living in a physical space
and subject to the laws of a sovereign state.
Finally, the case
of MED-TV reveals how satellite television has the ability to
contribute to the process of globalization by creating a public
and international space that requires countries to interact
on what have traditionally been issues internal to the sovereign
state. MED-TV chose to shelter itself under the civil liberties
of Europe and at the same time its transnational broadcasts
served as a powerful force within Turkey. In Turkey's effort
to limit MED-TV's liberties outside of Turkey's sovereign borders,
the presence of Kurdish legal and political representation in
Europe forced European politicians to take a stand on the Kurdish
issue. As a result, a conflict that had previously been contained
within the boundaries of Turkey's sovereign state imposed itself
on the political agendas of European countries and the United
States. This international forum and the ability to broadcast
transnationally requires a new level of interaction between
states in addressing the issue of how the freedoms allowed by
one sovereign nation can be construed as transgressing another
nation's laws across physical borders.
As Turkey has worked
towards becoming a member of the European Union, the presence
of the internationally recognized "Kurdish question"
and Turkey's record of oppression has led to a variety of changes
within Turkey, including greater freedoms for the Kurdish population
of Turkey. A number of reforms have been implemented as a precursor
to EU membership talks, including what happened on June 9, 2004,
when state-run Turkish television aired its first-ever broadcast
in the Kurdish dialect of Kurmandji. The power of MED-TV's satellite
television channel to project its conflict, internal to a sovereign
state, onto an international stage demonstrates a change in
the ability and power of a sovereign state to act without the
interference of other states.
In conclusion, the
question must be raised to what extent satellite television,
and the case of MED-TV, represents an example of greater freedom
for the media in a world without borders. As we have seen, satellite
orbits are the trade routes of the twenty-first century. The
lack of clarity surrounding the legislation and control of these
trade routes leaves the question open of whether they truly
represent the possibility of greater freedom. These trade routes,
although not strictly controlled by nation-states, are still
heavily influenced by political pressure. In the case of MED-TV,
the Turkish government was able to use its power to dissuade
companies from supplying satellite space as well as use its
diplomatic power to create an image of MED-TV as the mouthpiece
of terrorists.
Although MED-TV found
a modicum of refuge under the civil liberties of Europe, it
was also constrained to operate under European laws, subject
to interpretation. The vagaries of what constitutes an impartial
broadcast and what is considered inciting to violence created
an avenue for political pressure, leading to the revocation
of MED-TV's license on legal grounds.
The cost of running
a satellite channel can create an obstacle for greater freedom
for the media, especially in cases of virtual nationalism. When
costs are high and the ability to collection of advertising
revenues is complicated, satellite broadcasting opens up the
potential for the media to be greatly constrained by the desires
of wealthy contributors. And because virtual nationalism lacks
the power, protection, and resources of a sovereign state, it
remains in a position of weakness in independently challenging
existing state institutions.
That being said,
the issues raised by the ability to broadcast across borders,
especially the idea of virtual nationalism, present a major
challenge to the way nation-states will be forced to interact
in the future. The story of MED-TV demonstrates how the existence
of virtual space has created a platform that requires nation-states
to interact with one another on a new level. The existence of
this virtual space carries the potential of creating a greater
freedom for the media, in spite of many challenges. The economic,
social, and legal factors involved in satellite television are
changing the way the world communicates and leading the way
towards a new stage in the history of the dynamic between nation-states
and the media.
William Merrifield
is currently working to complete his masters degree in Middle
Eastern Studies at the American University in Beirut.
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