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Divided and Confused:
The reporting of the first two weeks of the war in Iraq on Turkish television
channels
By Dilruba Catalbas
When the US and its allies
first attacked Iraq in 1991, the Turkish electronic media field was on the brink
of a major transformation. The first private television channel, Star, had already
begun beaming its signals from Germany on 1 March 1990 thanks to transnational
satellite broadcasting. It was said that beside its down-market, entertainment-oriented
programming policy, its continuous retransmission of CNN during the Gulf War contributed
greatly to the popularity of the newly launched private television.
Although it had significantly
extended its global reach in the early 1990s, Turkey's public broadcaster, TRT,
was hardly a genuine transnational broadcaster. Foreign news had never been one
of TRT's strong points for it had always been dependent on international news
agencies and Western media. Thus CNN proved to be the most important source of
news about the Gulf War for both TRT and Star. This was not surprising given that
so many other broadcasters in so many other countries also relied heavily on CNN
and its exclusive coverage. It is worth mentioning, however, that very few among
these countries have closer geographical, cultural and historical ties with the
region than Turkey does.
Since the days of the
Gulf War, the broadcasting scene in Turkey has changed beyond recognition. Three
years after the launch of Star, broadcasting legislation was amended to acknowledge
the growing competitive, multi-channel broadcasting system. By the year 2000,
the number of national television channels was 16 while there were 15 regional
and 229 local stations. In addition to general interest channels, there were 24-hour
news channels, such as NTV and CNN TURK, and thematic channels, like CNBC-e. According
to an audience survey conducted between 26 and 28 September 2002, the most widely
watched channels were atv, Show TV, Kanal D, Star, and TRT. These channels also
have a large following among the Turkish-speaking communities living in various
European countries.
Ready for the 'The
First War of the 21st Century'
In contrast to what had
happened during the Gulf War, Turkish media was not caught unprepared by the war
in Iraq. When the first American bombs started falling on Baghdad all the major
television stations and newspapers had already stationed their own reporters in
and around the country. They had reporters in Kuwait, Qatar and various towns
along the Turkish border. AA (Anatolian Agency), the Turkish national news agency,
and private news agencies CHA (Cihan News Agency) and IHA (Ihlas News Agency)
were among the domestic news agencies that covered the war.
From the first day the
two leading news broadcasters, NTV and CNN TURK and TRT2 (the second channel of
the public broadcaster) devoted all their broadcast time to the reporting of the
war. They kept commercial breaks and coverage of other news to a minimum. In addition
to rolling news up-dates and continuous studio discussions with various experts,
they frequently interrupted their programming to broadcast live pictures and press
conferences from what they referred as the 'hot spots' of the war. Usually the
screens were split to place more than one picture source at once. Graphics in
and between news reports were used to explain maps, plans, weapons, and equipment.
The choice of red as the background color was one of the common features of the
presentation.
Although it did not have
a nonstop coverage, TV 8 should be mentioned among those who spent substantial
time and energy on the reporting of the war. Mainstream channels, Star, Show TV,
Kanal D, TGRT, atv as well as Islamist channels Kanal 7 and STV largely limited
their reporting of the war to their regular news bulletins and continued with
their usual schedules. As a result, an average television viewer had a very peculiar
array of programming at the touch of his or her remote button. On the one hand,
some channels broadcast seriously distressing scenes and reports from the war
while others went on with cheerful down-market entertainment and music shows.
Some viewers perceived this rather postmodern collage of suffering and amusement
as a major deficit of commonsense.
Behind the screens of
the war in Iraq, the two major news channels, NTV and CNN TURK, were waging their
own ratings war. All the major television channels discovered in war a chance
for self-promotion and were trying to carve out a positive image for themselves.
NTV's most frequently used slogan 'That Moment Is On NTV' was heard over the dramatic
images of the war. CNN TURK, on the other hand, stressed its association with
CNN International Networks (CNNI). "Latest on war in Iraq from 26 different spots
and 57 reporters! Special reports and news footage of CNNI's front reporters,
who never stop chasing American forces, are on CNN TURK only." Kanal D boasted
that they were the ones which first broadcast the bombing of Iraq live on 20 March,
2003. CNN TURK and Kanal D, both of which belong to Dogan Media Group, the largest
media corporation in Turkey, also had full-page advertisements published several
times in the group's papers.
Although Turkish television
channels had many news sources at their disposal, the rising star of the war in
Iraq was undoubtedly the Al Jazeera television. Even CNN TURK was broadcasting
pictures from Al Jazeera and the Abu Dhabi Space Channel. CNN TURK's reporters
in Baghdad together with their colleagues from CNNI had been expelled from Iraq
on 21 March, 2003. There were reports that since the beginning of the war Al Jazeera
considerably increased its cable subscription in Europe and that Turkish viewers
were making calls for Digiturk, the major digital platform in Turkey, to include
Al Jazeera in its package.
From a swift victory
to a prolonged conflict
Turkish media in general
seemed to envisage a swift and easy victory for the US. CNN TURK reported on 21
March that a British spokesman claimed that they would enter Baghdad within 3
to 4 days. The flicking pictures from the cameras of the embedded reporters, showing
the US army rolling unopposed through dessert were reinforcing this prediction.
That kind of footage and information were also in accordance with the framework
in which the approaching war had been presented to the public: the invincible
super power sweeping across Iraq in a matter of days.
Therefore, the early reports
about the escape of Tariq Aziz, the killing of Taha Yasin Ramadan, and the fall
of Iraqi cities like Umm Qasr did not meet with much skepticism. It was announced
that US intelligence had made a deal with Iraqi generals to surrender together
with their men and Americans expected a coup against Saddam. Meanwhile scary scenarios
about the possible evil deeds of Saddam Hussein were abundant. The Pentagon's
claims that Saddam Hussein could destroy the damns on the Euphrates and Tigris,
set fire to the oil fields and use his chemical weapons were reported repeatedly.
However, it did not take long for journalists to discover that many of these reports
were either exaggerated or simply false and that they were probably part of the
propaganda war.
Before the end of the
first week the pictures of the fearful faces of captured American soldiers, broadcast
by Al Jazeera, seemed to undermine the confidence in a rapid victory. The US military
high command and the Bush administration were quick to condemn Iraq for violating
the Geneva Convention. But this was not found very convincing as pictures of Iraqi
prisoners of war had been all over the media since the second day. Many commentators
agreed it would be a double standard to evoke the international law when the legality
of the war itself was questionable.
In addition to the continuous
reports of what was going on in the front, Turkish television channels covered
the war mostly in terms of its relevance to Turkey. A more global perspective
regarding the unfolding of the events and debates in other countries was largely
missing. Within this evidently ethnocentric approach the prime importance was
assigned to US-Turkey relations, which had been strained since the Turkish Parliament
rejected on 1 March, 2003, a government proposal to grant permission to the US
military to deploy its troops on Turkish soil. The second motion to grant the
US permission to use the airspace and allow Turkish Army to send military personnel
into northern Iraq passed the vote on 20 March 2003 but following the vote it
seemed that the Turkish and American sides could not reach a prompt agreement
on overflight rights. There was speculation on televised debates that the delay
was caused by the disagreement between Turkey and the US over northern Iraq. The
US military and political spokesmen were sending open messages that they would
not accept the Turkish military entering northern Iraq. Turkey, on the other hand,
had declared that she would not accept an independent Kurdish state and said she
would intervene if Kurdish Peshmerga groups entered Mosul and Kirkuk, causing
a threat to the Turcoman population. Another significant aspect of the ethnocentric
treatment of the war in Iraq was the emphasis placed on its impact on the already
feeble Turkish economy and on the role of Turkey in the post-Saddam order.
View points and comments
Anti-war but pro-US Military
experts, international relations and foreign policy analysts, ex-diplomats and
politicians dominated much of the coverage in the first two weeks. Several retired
generals of the Turkish military sat next to the presenters and anchors in the
studio to offer their views and analysis on the military moves and strategy. The
current war in Iraq was constantly compared with the last Gulf War and other wars
in near and distant history in order to assess relative successes and failures.
CNN TURK and NTV had their own military advisers while TRT frequently interviewed
experts at ASAM (Eurasia Strategic Research Center). The military commentators
did not doubt that the US forces would eventually defeat Saddam's army but they
seemed to agree that it would be much harder for the US to control Iraq than to
occupy it.
The coverage of military
affairs on both NTV and CNN TURK were deepened by several special pieces, which
meticulously explored American and Iraqi military units and weaponry. A viewer
in a televised debate expressed his frustration, shared by many others, by saying,
"I don't want to know the technical capacity of the B-52 bombers. The media should
tell me about the Iraqi people."
The dominance of the so-called
accredited sources on many television programs left little room for the views
of the person on the street. Although the media knew that Turkish public opinion
was decisively against the war and opposed involvement by Turkey in it, there
were hardly any vox populi interviews. A few exceptional opportunities for ordinary
viewers to explain their views were provided by atv's well known studio discussion
program, Siyaset Meydani (The Political Arena) and by NTV's question and answer
program, called 'Acik Hat' (Open Line).
Another group largely
ignored by the media was the anti-war movement and peace initiatives. Their activities
whether at home or abroad were covered almost entirely as street protests with
no background information as to who these people were and what they wanted. The
spokespersons of the peace initiatives were excluded from the distinguished chorus
of experts and television intellectuals.
Although the focus was
overwhelmingly on "what is happening today," there was also extensive analysis
of the background and probable consequences of the war. It was frequently expressed
that the war was part of a larger American strategy not just for the region but
for the entire world. The real motives behind the war, many commentators agreed,
were to secure the control of oil reserves, to defeat the competition from the
EU and to strengthen the security of Israel. Some commentators insisted that this
war should be understood as an attempt to change the maps in the old Ottoman hinterland.
It was pointed out that one of the most significant consequences of the war was
that it caused a major division in the EU and brought questions about the long-term
survival and viability of the UN.
Due to the ethnocentric
perspective of the media toward the war, most commentaries and debate were about
US-Turkey relations. The views seemed to be grouped into three major lines. The
first line of argument was in favor of complete harmony with the USA and her global
policies. Another group would argue that Turkey could support the war in return
for some concessions beneficial to her national interests. A third line of argument
insisted that whatever the costs, Turkey should follow an independent and consistent
policy as desired by the majority of its citizens. (1)
In the first days of the
war most of the commentaries seemed to adopt the first line of argument that Turkey
could not afford to offend the US. Well known television journalists like Cengiz
Candar and Mehmet Ali Birand as well as some ex-diplomats like Yalim Eralp voiced
their concerns that the disagreement between the US and Turkey were taking relations
to a dangerous crossroads. They alleged that the 50 year-old strategic partnership
between the US and Turkey was over. Yalim Eralp claimed Americans felt deceived
and there would be anger against Turkey. While some observers were concerned that
the US would punish Turkey, some liberal journalists, like Mehmet Barlas argued
that without the American economic aid Turkey could be worse than Argentina and
could even have a regime problem.
These sorts of views had
their echoes on CNN TURK in the words of some American commentators as well. One
such commentator, Henry Barkey, told Mehmet Ali Birand that the US didn't need
Turkey anymore. Barkey claimed the biggest trump card of Turkey was the existence
of Saddam. Now that Saddam was out of the picture Turkey came out the loser. He
also said the Turkish Parliament had made a big mistake and predicted that this
would lead to problems. A similar perspective was voiced by others like Morton
Abramowitz, the ex-US ambassador to Ankara and Helena Finn from New York International
Relations Council. Abramowitz said that there was a big disappointment in the
US and that relations were deeply harmed. He added that Turkey must meet the urgent
demands on the use of airspace as soon as possible. Helena Finn said Turkey could
not understand how serious the US was and it was a shame that she stayed out of
the game. (2)
These kinds of remarks
from some American commentators and apologetic responses of some Turkish journalists
and commentators caused resentment among viewers and divided the journalistic
community. Politicians like Onur Oymen, Kemal Dervis and Ismail Cem denied these
kinds of gloomy conclusions and asserted that the US-Turkey relations were much
stronger than these pessimist accounts assumed. Later the decision of the Bush
administration to allocate one billion dollars in aid to Turkey and the unexpected
visit of Colin Powell to Ankara were seen as indications of the improvements in
the relations.
Even though journalists
and television commentators were divided about Turkey's role in this war, one
thing they had in common was their disillusionment with the government. During
the first two weeks of the war, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government
had to face serious criticism from many different quarters for failing to manage
the crisis. Of course, what these parties expected from this crisis management
was completely different. While liberals seemed deeply disappointed with the present
situation, commentators in the anti-war front such as Nuray Mert, Rusen Cakir,
and Fehmi Koru claimed that the current position of Turkey was better than active
involvement.
Although they took a very
critical stance against the war, Islamist channels Kanal 7 and STV seemed not
to adopt an overly heavy-handed approach towards the AKP government. Although
their frame of reference in relation to the war was an emphasis on Islamic identity
and solidarity, they seemed to downplay the AKP government's pro-American attitude.
In this way, they differed from Star, which from the very beginning adopted a
very populist strategy of reporting. Although news programs on Star criticized
the war, their major target seemed to be the AKP government. The owner of Star,
Cem Uzan had competed with AKP in the last elections on 3 November, 2002, and
received around 7 percent of the votes cast with the help of his populist and
nationalist election campaign.
Media War within the
War
The war in Iraq divided
the Turkish journalism community. There appeared to be two major groups independent
of the ideological positions of their members. The first group of journalists
and commentators opposed the war as they found it illegal and unfair and objected
to Turkey's involvement in it. In opposition to that group there was a crowded
group of pragmatists, who would say that the war was unfortunate but that Turkey
must go along with the US in order to turn it into her advantage. Although much
smaller in numbers, anti-war groups seemed to have greater public sympathy behind
them. (3)
The way these two groups
interpreted the media treatment of the war undoubtedly reflected their position.
The anti-war camp accused some pragmatists like Ertugrul Ozkok, the editor in
chief of Hurriyet and one of the top executives of the Dogan Media Group, of warmongering.
Those in the pragmatist camp, on the other hand, accused writers, commentators,
and everybody else on the anti-war front of ignorance, naivety, and even disloyalty.
The head of the Turkish Parliament, Bulent Arinc, and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer
also became the targets of these pragmatists because of their outspokenness against
the war. In response Arinc said that some Turkish journalists were behaving like
"the Pentagon's mouthpiece."
Commercial hostilities
between media owners found their way into the coverage of the war. It was claimed
on Show TV that the reason why some papers belonging to the Dogan Media Group
supported the war was that Aydin Dogan, the owner of the group, expected large
revenues from the sale of oil to American military forces through his petroleum
company, POAS.
The coverage of the war
by Turkish and Western media was subjected to scrutiny in some television programs
and newspaper articles. While NTV received praise for its balanced and objective
reporting the most unlikely winner seemed to be TRT. CNN TURK, on the other hand,
received a lot of criticism for its handling of the war from the US perspective.
Interviews conducted by Mehmet Ali Birand with some hardline American commentators,
such as Harlan Ullman, the designer of the notorious "shock and awe" concept,
contributed particularly to this criticism.
With regard to Western
media treatment of the war a number of points seemed to be shared by different
observers. First, the objectivity and impartiality of the so-called embedded reporters
were found questionable. Second, it was argued that British and American television
channels failed the test of objectivity and impartiality, the two main principles
of Anglo-Saxon journalism, which they had taught the rest of the world. It was
found noteworthy that the BBC, ITN, Sky and Fox News cast doubt on the credibility
of all news items originating with Iraqi sources by saying that they could be
black propaganda while they would pass on information from Pentagon as if it was
indisputable. The collapse of the long-lived myth of the impartial BBC was particularly
remarkable as it had been the prime role model for supporters of independent public
service broadcasting in Turkey. Third it was found totally unethical that some
Western journalists asked for and supported the bombing of Iraq TV.
In conclusion: Reality
is larger than the media
Unlike the Gulf war, viewers
in Turkey had the chance to receive news from many different sources. In addition
to terrestrial channels, cable and satellite operators supply all the major Western
channels. However, a large majority of viewers has not shown a great deal of interest
in newscasts about the war. Rating reports showed that the main evening newscasts
of the major channels were far behind those of the popular sit-coms and soap operas.
The lack of interest on
the part of the viewers may well be due to a number of interrelated reasons. First,
the so-called pre-emptive war doctrine of the Bush regime was not able to win
the minds and hearts of people in Turkey. According to the findings of a recent
public opinion survey, 77 percent of the respondents believed that the real reason
for the war was to protect US interests in the region. Only 5.7 percent mentioned
Iraq's disobedience to the UN resolution. (4) Thus, it could be said that ordinary
people developed an inner resistance towards the war. This resistance turned into
contempt with the help of the scenes like the notorious "shock and awe." The pictures
of this massive bombing of Baghdad succeeded in horrifying viewers in Turkey.
Second, public opinion in Turkey had long grown wary of the liberal mainstream
media. The distrust of the audience was reinforced by the large amount of misinformation
passed on to public, particularly in the first days of the war with little careful
checking and double checking.
Many well-known television
journalists and commentators failed to assess correctly public sentiment, which
was decisively against the war and called for support for Iraqi civilians. This
was hardly surprising, considering the growing inconsistency between the attitudes
of large segments of the population and the core media in Turkey. AKP won the
last elections despite the negative coverage that it received from the liberal
mainstream media.
It can be argued that
pro-US commentaries advanced by some liberal writers and broadcasters have also
been largely counterproductive in terms of winning public consent for the war.
Ragip Duran, an experienced journalist, explains this by the mismatch between
media reality and the 'real' social reality of our times. He asserts that media
loses its persuasive power to the extent that it distances itself from the public
and approaches the rulers and thus coveys the media reality instead of the 'real'
reality. However, it would be wrong to assume, as some liberal journalists do,
mostly to silence their critics, that this will lead to some deep seated anti-Americanism
in Turkish society. Although these commentators rarely make a distinction between
the Bush administration and the USA, a great majority of the people on the street
in Turkey do.
More than two weeks into
the war, the media already gives some indications that it is tiring of it. Even
the 24-hour broadcasters have relaxed their coverage and turned to different subjects.
When this is over, very few details will be remembered. The most memorable moments
will, no doubt, be the ones about human suffering. But how many of us will really
remember what was the point of it all? TBS
Notes
Dilruba Çatalbas is Associate
Professor of Journalism at the University of Galatasaray, in Istanbul. She received
her PhD in Communication from the University of London, Goldsmith's College, her
MA from Leeds University, and her BA from the University of Istanbul. She teaches
and researches in areas concerning economic, political, international, and regulatory
dimensions of public communication and journalism. |