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continued: "Al-Jazeera:
Here We Stand; We Can Do No Otherwise" by Yosri Fouda
In my opinion, this success does not restrict itself to the small screen of Al-Jazeera. Surprisingly, it manifests itself probably more obviously on other people's screens. MBC, for instance, had to abolish some of what is internally understood as red lines since the advent of the newcomer. A whole new set of programs which look like typical "inventions" of Al-Jazeera has been introduced to most, if not all, Arab satellite channels. Another rather comical influence of Al-Jazeera reminds you of that of the popular Egyptian singer Abdel Halim Hafez: hated by rivals but copied by many of them. As it was officially stated, Abu Dhabi TV suddenly appeared from nowhere to "counter challenge Al-Jazeera's effect, as did Arab News Network (ANN) in a bandwagon fashion. Nevertheless, some of the many who only copied Abdel Halim's hairstyle later learned a thing or two and were able to develop their own character. Similarly, it can only be positive for the rest of the Arab channels to follow suit, even if they do so from a negatively charged position with an aim to undermine Al-Jazeera more than to surpass it. What brings optimism to my door, though, is the fact that the Arab citizen has all of a sudden paused to think again and the fact that the experience of freedom is in a sense like the experience of death: you cannot cross to it and come back again. It is clear that Al-Jazeera has become, more than just a mass medium, a political and cultural phenomenon in the Arab world, but it would be such a mistake if its decision makers and program makers fell into the trap of looking at it in this way. They know more than anyone else that the crucial card which made, and still makes, it the center of attention--i.e. the unprecedented freedom--is but a grant from upstairs. This grant can simply be claimed back at any moment for whatever reason, and this is the fact that should not be driven aside by false conquests. Editorial freedom is a massive plus, no thanks to program makers, and investing it in a professional manner is real journalism, thanks to some program makers. The critical bridge has already been crossed over with a few kilos of salt. People are now living with the phenomenon--some enthusiastically, some reluctantly, some suspiciously, and some will just never accept it. Deep inside those, though, is a sense of "let it be. Maybe I will need it one day." Investigating the 1999 crash of EgyptAir flight 990 provided me with an excellent example. For three months after the horrible incident, Egypt TV's 20 or so channels did absolutely nothing while some American sources were using world media to spread rumors and premature conclusions everywhere. Only after I, through my program "Top Secret," managed to prove technically the impossibility of the suicide theory did Egyptian media shyly have the stomach to applaud Al-Jazeera. Such is the "success" of Al-Jazeera that you get the feeling, in the course of your job, that it is already included, irrespective of where it stands professionally, on the VIP watch list of many interested parties. They see in it an honest (and free) source of information about Arab public opinion and attitudes. You do not even have to tune in, as you can simply log on to www.aljazeera.net. It is heaven for an intelligence officer who likes to analyze. The 1998 Desert Fox operation and the 1999 Usama Bin Laden exclusive are but two examples of the scoops which, every now and then, turn the heads of the world towards a desert-based channel. It is all epitomized in a frame hung on one of the managing director's walls: the front page of the British newspaper, The Times, with a night shot of the bombardment of Baghdad. On the bottom right corner you clearly see the familiar CNN logo, but with some effort you discover underneath it a not-so-familiar-to-the-ordinary-western-eye kind of logo: Al-Jazeera's. Thanks to Doha, the whole world knew about it. In the year 2000 "Top Secret" registered another scoop when, with the help of a well-known British scientist, I managed to link the use of some 30 tons of depleted uranium during the Gulf War to the spread of cancer and birth defects in southern Iraq. The investigation was complete four months before Europe even began to wonder about the mysterious death of six Kosovo-based NATO soldiers. When I sent him the master tape my boss initially got cold feet. Having found it hard to believe, he brought together a few aides and opened a conference line between them in Doha and me in London. Al-Jazeera has a unique administrative and organizational system which is hard, realistically, to find in another organization or in a textbook. It is a mixture of the tribal with the urban, the Eastern with the Western, the leftist with the rightist, and the religious with the secular. This, according to the eyes of the beholder, is either genius or total failure. But although things are working out quite impressively, I do not attribute much of Al-Jazeera's success to what takes place within what Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, having visited the Doha newsroom, described as "the match box" as much as I attribute it to outside factors. It is my conviction that Al-Jazeera's enemy number one is the fact that there is not another Al-Jazeera in Arabic. That is why Arab citizens are excited about the fact that they, for a change, do not get from an Arab channel THE opinion, but "More Than One Opinion"; they are not taken in one direction, but also in the "Opposite Direction"; they do not get from the truth only what they are meant to know, but they get truth "Without Frontiers"; they do not see only what reinforces the status quo, but they are also taken to what could be a "Hot Spot"; and they are not taken for a ride in an oral culture of disinformation, but rather allowed access to what's officially categorized as "Top Secret." TBS |
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| Copyright
2001 Transnational Broadcasting Studies TBS is published by the Adham Center for Television Journalism, the American University in Cairo E-mail: TBS@aucegypt.edu |
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