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By
Philip Seib
In the Middle
East, as elsewhere, politics sometimes receives an unexpected
jolt that produces unanticipated consequences. This has happened
during the past decade as information and communication technologies
have become more pervasive and influential. This process is
accelerating.
A key factor
in this expansion of reach and power is the growing irrelevance
of borders. New media will facilitate transnational trends in
politics because the media themselves are increasingly transnational.
This will affect the dynamics of democratization by reducing
the isolation of movements for political change and by facilitating
detours around obstructions created by those currently holding
power.
The complexity
of democratization should be respected, however, and no single
factor’s impact should be overrated. Media effects, for
instance, are just part of a large political universe, the constituent
elements of which must come into alignment if democratization
is to develop. That said we should not underrate the role of
the media. As Mohammed Jassim al-Ali, former managing director
of Al Jazeera, has said: “Democracy is coming to the Middle
East because of the communication revolution. You can no longer
hide information and must now tell the people the truth. If
you don’t, the people won’t follow you, they won’t
support you, they won’t obey you.”(1) That may overstate
the situation, but the premise is sound in the sense that democratic
reverberations are being felt in parts of the Middle East that
rarely have been touched by such impulses in the past.
This is
not merely a matter of theory. Media tools have been put to
use in political protests in Lebanon, Egypt, and elsewhere.
Transnational satellite television, for example, can—to
a certain extent—evade controls imposed on news coverage
within a country. The 2005 “Cedar Revolution” in
Lebanon demonstrated how this can work on two levels. Regional/international
coverage—such as is provided by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya,
among others—could provide information to Lebanese audiences
with less concern about political repercussions that might deter
some indigenous media organizations. By showing the size and
energy of the protests, such coverage helped fuel the demonstrations
and encouraged broader pressure for Syrian withdrawal.
It is worth
noting in this context that transnational media are not necessarily
external media. Lebanese television channels, some of which
are available on satellite, also intensively covered this story,
as did radio stations and print media that reached regional
and global audiences through the Internet. In Lebanon, as in
any other country, indigenous news content is likely to be affected
by the political, sectarian, and other interests of those who
own and run media organizations. News consumers must take this
into account when evaluating the information they receive.
The reports
from Lebanon reached viewers throughout the region, letting
them see political activity that they might decide to emulate.
Later demonstrations elsewhere incorporated television-friendly
tactics that were seen in the Beirut coverage. In Jordan, national
flags were prominently displayed in front of the news media’s
cameras, which helped avoid having the protests dismissed as
simply factional discord.(2) Overall, notes Bernard Lewis, television
“brings to the peoples of the Middle East a previously
unknown spectacle—that of lively and vigorous public disagreement
and debate.”(3)
Coverage
of the Lebanon story is just one example that underscores the
significance of the transnational nature of new media technologies.
Some governments try to impose an intellectual sovereignty that
ensures perpetuation of the status quo and prevents penetration
by “discordant” ideas and actions. Freer movement
of information, which is partly a function of globalization,
works against repressive sovereignty of this kind and improves
prospects for democratization. The increased flow of information
does not, however, in itself guarantee a surge of democracy.
Increased plurality of self-expression is useful, but sometimes
it can be more a cacophony than a coherent, purpose-driven chorus.
As with many of the elements of democratization, expanding public
debate and participation is merely one of the numerous incremental
steps needed in the process.
Communications
pressures in the Middle East have been building for more than
a decade, and governments have tried to control emerging technologies
by licensing fax machines, blocking Web sites, finding friendly
owners for satellite TV stations, and so on. But such measures
can be circumvented as more satellite stations begin broadcasting,
cell phone owners send text messages, and public ingenuity finds
new ways to avoid government controls.(4) For example, the London-based
Saudi Human Rights Center used satellite radio and television
to encourage demonstrations in Riyadh. Islah Radio promoted
Saudi reform in its broadcasts from short-wave transmitters
at an unrevealed location (thought to be in Lithuania) and via
the Hotbird satellite to take advantage of the substantial number
of households with satellite reception in Saudi Arabia. Since
most of the audience wants TV pictures, not just radio words,
Islah Television was born, presenting just its logo and text
information scrolling on the screen with the radio broadcasts
as the audio. The station eventually provided programming with
more audience appeal, including a call-in show featuring the
station’s driving force, Saad al-Faqih, who responded
to viewers’ e-mails, faxes, and phone calls placed through
an Internet phone service (which allowed them to avoid government
eavesdroppers). Al-Faqih consistently criticized the Saudi princes,
at one point calling them “thieves who should be beheaded
instead of petty criminals.” The Saudi government apparently
fought back, as the short-wave and television signals were jammed
and pressure was brought to bear on the European TV transmission
providers to drop the station. In December 2004, the station
was on the air with a new satellite home that let it be more
insulated from economic pressure. As all this was going on,
the station had achieved small but noteworthy results in its
efforts to encourage demonstrations in support of human rights
within Saudi Arabia.(5)
Without
judging the merits of the station’s content, its struggle
for existence illustrates the kind of battle that can be expected
as new media organizations confront governments that are unaccustomed
to being challenged. Other Arab broadcasting and print news
organizations that are based outside the region and compete
against state monopolies are further expanding the amounts of
information available to Middle East publics.(6) As journalist
Youssef Ibrahim has observed, “The din of democracy talk
has been amplified by satellite television, the Internet, and
cell phones, and that is a new wrinkle for autocratic regimes
experienced at quiet repression.”(7)
Over the
long term, the Internet may prove to be even more potent as
a force for reform, although this will take time, given the
limited Internet access within most of the Middle East. Once
more widespread Internet access takes hold in the region, the
intrinsic political vitality of the World Wide Web is likely
to change the way people view their own countries and the rest
of the world. Information from news organizations and other
sources that were previously out of reach will be tapped and
the interactive nature of the Internet will foster the intellectual
enfranchisement that opens the way to political change.
The Internet
is an increasingly significant presence in international politics,
but its lasting impact remains uncertain. Shanthi Kalathil and
Taylor C. Boas have noted that the Internet “is only a
tool, and its specific uses by political, economic, and societal
actors must be carefully weighed and considered,”(8) and
Charles Kupchan has observed that the “international effects
of the information revolution, just like those of economic interdependence,
depend upon the broader political context in which these technologies
are deployed.”(9) In other words, the Internet should
not be viewed as a cure-all by advocates of democracy. It is
a tool for reform, but there must be people willing to use the
tool to bring about systemic change.
Although
the Internet can generate political pressure because it is intrinsically
democratic, the effect it will have in the Arab world remains
speculative, particularly because Arab states lag far behind
most of the rest of the world in taking advantage of this technology.
As of 2003 there were only 18 computers per 1,000 people in
Arab countries, compared to the global average of 78 per thousand.(10)
Even with
access, Internet users in some countries encounter government
controls, with sites that are found officially bothersome blocked.
The Saudi government’s Internet Services Unit states that
“all sites that contain content in violation of Islamic
tradition or national regulations shall be blocked.”(11)
Among these blocked sites are Amnesty International’s
Web pages related to Saudi Arabia, the Encyclopedia Britannica’s
“Women in American History,” Rolling Stone
magazine, and Warner Brothers Records. In Egypt, some of the
Muslim Brotherhood’s Web sites, such as ikhwanonline.com,
occasionally have been blocked, which is noteworthy given the
putative efforts to make the Egyptian electoral process more
open.
Besides
blocking, some governments establish their own Web sites to
present their version of issues and events that people may be
learning about from the news media. The Lebanese Army has its
own site (lebarmy.gov.lb), the Palestinian Authority uses the
Web to present its policy views (pna.gov.ps), and in the United
States, the Pentagon offers its online take on the war on terrorism
(defendamerica.mil). How much credibility these quasi-news sites
have with the public varies from country to country, but they
provide a means for governments to compete with conventional
news providers as sources of information.
Other entities
such as NGOs effectively use the Internet to make their case
to global audiences and for purposes ranging from stimulating
news coverage to raising money. Terrorist organizations also
use Web sites to recruit, fund raise, and proselytize. Despite
government efforts to deny these groups access to the news media
and the public, terrorist Web sites have proven successful in
disseminating material such as pronouncements from Osama Bin
Laden, propaganda disguised as newscasts, online jihadist magazines,
and video footage of executions of kidnap victims. Since the
goal of these organizations is to instill terror in the public,
the Web is a valuable device for delivering their message in
sometimes horrific fashion.
The Internet
is also important in recruiting, training, and communicating
with terrorist groups’ adherents. One example is the June
2005 online release of a 46-minute video, “All Religion
Will Be for Allah,” produced by Abu Musab Zarqawi’s
Iraqi branch of al Qaeda that featured a corps of suicide bombers-in-training.
It was disseminated by a specially designed Web page with numerous
links for downloading, including one for playing it on a cell
phone.(12)
Open access
to media venues and the easy dissemination of unmediated media
may be viewed as information democracy, but because this freedom
is available to all, regardless of their intentions, it may
be abused, as can be seen in the terrorist examples. News organizations
are sometimes inadvertently complicit in this as their coverage
of terrorists’ pronouncements reaches a much larger audience
than could be achieved through the original Webcast, videotape,
or other message. This raises issues about mainstream media’s
gatekeeper role, and the European Union has urged media organizations
to draw up a code of conduct to ensure that they do not become
de facto propagandists for terrorists.(13)
Yet another
use of the Internet with significant political potential is
blogging. Blogs amplify voices that may have previously gone
unheard. As such they foster a degree of democratic parity at
least in terms of expanding audience access for those who feel
they have something worthwhile to say. The blogging firmament
is already crowded and becoming more so (as of October 2005,
blog search engine Technorati covered roughly 19 million blogs),
but bloggers are good at finding each other and reaching audiences.
Particularly
in countries where governments have tried to suppress political
organization, blogging may prove to be valuable in orchestrating
pressure for reform. In 2005, bloggers in Lebanon and elsewhere
spurred debate about the perpetrators and aftershocks of the
assassination of Rafiq Hariri—a debate that could be joined
by anyone with Internet access, regardless of some governments’
desire to stifle these discussions. Another example of political
blogging could be seen in 2002 when Bahrainis dissatisfied with
conventional media coverage of a scandal related to the national
pension fund could read less constrained analysis on blogs such
as “Bahraini blogsite” or “Mahmood’s
Den.”(14) Talk about such matters has expanded from the
neighborhood coffee house to global proportions, enlisting participants
and encouraging electronic speech and the thinking behind it.
Some time will have to pass before this phenomenon’s long-term
political impact can be determined, but if bloggers’ talk
leads to expanded bloggers’ activism, this may be yet
another way that mass media provide impetus for democratization.
While the
Internet is put to increasing use, an even more common communications
device is proving increasingly useful in mobilizing activists.
Text messaging on cell phones facilitates organization of demonstrations
and circulation of political information. Particularly when
political parties are restricted, text messages can be sent
to unofficial membership lists. In Kuwait, women organizing
protests about voting rights in 2005 found their effectiveness
increased because they could summon young women from schools
by sending text messages. In May 2005, Kuwaiti women were granted
the right to vote and to be candidates in parliamentary and
local council elections. In Lebanon, text messages (and e-mails)
were used to mobilize anti-Syrian demonstrators in March 2005.(15)
Fawzi Guleid of the National Democratic Institute in Bahrain
observed that text messaging fosters expansion of speech because
it “allows people to send messages that they would not
say in public.” It also should be noted, however, that
text messaging lends itself to the spread of rumors and anonymous
attacks. Rola Dashti, one of the organizers of the women’s
rights demonstrations in Kuwait, was the subject of widely circulated
text messages that criticized her for her Lebanese and Iranian
ancestry and alleged that she had received funds from the American
embassy. Her response: “It means I’m making them
nervous…and I’d better get used to it.”(16)
Is it the Right Time?
Advocates
of democracy in the Middle East cannot ignore the reality of
having many obstacles to overcome. In new media technology,
there is a digital wadi, a “deep and daunting canyon”
with regard to the region’s Web access compared to that
of much of the rest of the world. The 2003 Arab Human Development
Report notes that although the number of Internet users in Arab
states grew by 60 percent from 2000 to 2001, the total was only
4.2 million, or 1.6 percent of the Arab population.(17) (Among
the factors contributing to the level of technology use in the
Middle East and some other parts of the world is the overall
literacy rate and the usefulness of having a working knowledge
of English.)
Even a development
as encouraging as the increased availability of satellite television
is not a panacea for political problems. Hugh Miles has observed
in his book about Al Jazeera that “optimists theorize
that satellite TV will sweep away traditional Arab obstacles
to progress and dissolve seemingly intractable problems and
that an ‘Islamic Glasnost’ will ensue... But to
believe that satellite television is automatically going to
make Arab societies democratic is to presume that the current
state of affairs in the Arab world results from an information
deficiency, which is not true. Except in the most authoritarian
Arab countries, the news has long been available to the determined
via the radio, and that has never brought about much democracy.”
Miles added that even if Arab satellite television viewers see
something on the air that leads them to change their minds about
an issue, “there is still no political mechanism in place
for them to do anything about it.”(18) Miles makes a valid
point, but it should be kept in mind that audience size is important
in itself and the significance of sheer numbers with easy, frequent
access to diverse sources of information should not be underestimated.
When a critical mass has better access to information, political
processes are likely to change.
Nevertheless,
optimism about prospects for media-inspired reform should be
tempered with caution. Mohamed Zayani wrote: “One should
be skeptical about the often ambitious transformative claims
for new media as well as the claims about its democratizing
potential and its ability not just to increase and widen participation
among the various social strata in the Arab world, but to transform
social and political organization. Real change cannot be expected
solely or mainly from the media sector. Democracy cannot emanate
just from the media; the political systems and institutions
themselves have to change, evolve, and adapt….We should
not be under the illusion that satellite TV can dramatically
change society or revolutionize its institutions.”(19)
Similarly, Marc Lynch has written: “What one enthusiast
called ‘the Democratic Republic of Al Jazeera’ does
not, in fact, exist. Al Jazeera cannot create democracy on its
own, nor compel Arab leaders to change their ways. Television
talk shows cannot substitute for the hard work of political
organizing and institution building.”(20) Looking at this
from another angle, Mamoun Fandi has noted that the proliferation
of satellite television may create a virtual politics that citizens
watch, like an event in an arena, rather than actually becoming
participants. “Governments in the Arab world,” wrote
Fandi, “are encouraging the trend whereby the media become
a substitute for real politics.”(21)
All that
may be true, but skepticism should not be allowed to slip into
the cynical fatalism of the “change will never happen”
variety. Media might not make revolutions, but they certainly
can contribute to them. In the end, the public’s willingness
to act is the most crucial factor in reform.
A more optimistic
evaluation of media influence has been offered by Jon Alterman
of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has
argued that “as literacy and bandwidth both expand dramatically,
publics are exposed to a broad, often unregulated, spectrum
of views that range from secular to religious, from nationalist
to global, and from material to spiritual. Under the new paradigm,
information is demand-driven rather than supply-driven, and
the universe of available views is far broader than ever before.”
One consequence of more information being more widely communicated,
wrote Alterman, is “greater political spontaneity. Whereas
Arab politics have often been characterized by orchestrated
demonstrations of solidarity, anger, sorrow, or joy, the regime’s
ability to organize such demonstrations in the future will be
greatly diminished.”(22)
Media and Democratization: Work in Progress
The most
recent Arab Human Development Report acknowledges that “formidable
obstacles stand in the way of a society of freedom and good
governance in Arab countries. And this is an undeniable truth.
But at the end of this difficult journey, there lies a noble
goal, worthy of the hardships endured by those who seek it.”(23)
Despite
the presence of those obstacles, the Middle East in 2005 provided
fascinating illustrations of the ways that new media can surge
and influence the political climate. The reverberations of the
American invasion of Iraq continued and attracted much news
coverage and angry attention. A parallel story could be found
in the assertions of electoral freedom in Iraq and Palestine,
and other democratic manifestations (of varying degrees) in
Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. Reform seemed to
be developing momentum, sometimes on the level of headline-grabbing
politics, as with the Iraq elections, and sometimes on a more
incremental basis, as with the increasing assertiveness of some
Arab women.
The new
media played a critical role in all this; satellite television
showed Egyptians, Syrians, and others that real elections were
taking place in Palestine and Iraq, and showed Saudi women,
among others, that Arab women in some countries might actually
be allowed to hold positions in government (as in Bahrain) and
even drive cars.(24) For the Iraq elections particularly, Middle
Eastern television stations displayed their ambition and the
strengths of their hardware. Al Arabiya broadcast from eight
satellite trucks throughout Iraq, and used videophone links
and live feeds from neighboring countries. Al Jazeera, despite
being banned from broadcasting from within Iraq (an example
of the political obstacles that continue to impede information
flow), also offered heavy coverage.(25)
Supplementing
television’s influence, the Internet increasingly contributed
to the new sense of intellectual community:
• From Lebanon, “bloggingbeirut” provided
real-time Web video of the “Cedar Revolution” demonstrations
against Syria’s presence in the country. This demonstrated
how the speed and pervasiveness of the Internet make it a valuable
mobilization tool; along with cell phones it can keep people
abreast of what is happening and bring them into the streets.
• Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and elsewhere used the Web to
nurture a virtual state through online communication among members
of the far-flung Kurdish population. Traditional borders lose
relevance when they no longer impede the flow of ideas. Kurdistan
may not appear on conventional maps, but communications technology
helps make it real.
• On an even larger scale, extending far beyond the Middle
East, satellite television and the Internet are bringing a degree
of virtual cohesion to the ummah, giving members of the worldwide
Islamic population some easily accessible common ground despite
the many differences within this global community. The Internet
as a unifying tool does not require uniformity; members of dispersed
groups can tie themselves tightly or loosely, as they choose,
to a central cultural identity. The Internet connects on its
users’ terms.
It is significant
that these cases primarily involve indigenous media. Just a
few years ago—as recently as the Gulf War of 1991—audiences
in the Middle East remained largely dependent on Western news
sources such as CNN and the BBC. By the time of the US-led invasion
of Iraq in 2003, Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, and other Arab satellite
stations had supplanted the Western broadcasters as principal
providers of war news to the Arab world. One of the keys to
the increasing media influence within the Middle East is that
new media organizations are providing information about Arabs
that is produced and delivered by Arabs. Western media hegemony
is in decline and this aspect of globalization has significant
ramifications in the Middle East and elsewhere.
These issues
also are relevant to the public diplomacy efforts undertaken
by the United States. American policy makers should recognize
that public opinion in the Middle East is being galvanized not
by the lavishly funded U.S.-based broadcasting projects—such
as Alhurra television and Radio Sawa—but rather by regional
and local media sources that are taking advantage of new technologies.
Audience preferences are clear. A survey conducted by the Arab
Advisors Group, an Amman-based consulting firm, that found that
among Cairo households with satellite television reception,
88 percent watch Al Jazeera while 5 percent watch Alhurra. Similar
figures appear in studies of other Arab audiences.(26)
Emerging
from the rush of events and the shifting global and local political
dynamics is a region that is clearly changing—often quietly
and with small steps, but changing. If this is considered to
be an area where, in Bernard Lewis’s words, “things
had indeed gone badly wrong,”(27) maybe these changes
will be redemptive for those who live there. But if that is
to happen, further steps must be taken.
Moving
Onward
The availability
of communication and information systems is certain to keep
expanding. That will affect how individuals live and how nations
operate on intrastate, regional, and global levels. The Middle
East will not be the only area where this transformation occurs,
but the rate of acceleration and breadth of movement toward
democracy will be particularly significant there.
The news
media—with their audience expanding through new technologies—will
be among the most important players in determining how this
process turns out. The Absence of thoughtful standards that
most journalists decide to observe, could lead to democratization
foundering as tumult overwhelms progress. Gadi Wolfsfeld warned
about this tendency toward spectacle: “The news media
are a poor forum for public discourse over political issues.
The rules of access and norms of debate are mostly designed
to ensure a good show rather than an intelligent exchange of
views.” The obligation of journalists to recognize the
effects of information must go hand in hand with the democratization
process in the Middle East, or else the always-volatile politics
of the region will derail progress.
A related
factor to be weighed when looking ahead is the question of who
will best utilize and most benefit from new media. Jon Alterman
wrote that, “As control of public opinion increasingly
slips away from governments’ grasp, those who can organize
and mobilize will find a far more receptive environment than
any time in the recent past.” It is important to note,
he added, that this does not necessarily mean democratization,
because “Islamist groups in the Middle East are among
the most modern of political organizations, both in their techniques
of organizing and in the sophistication of their communications
strategies.”(28)
This is
an important point: Democracy can be blocked or undermined by
parties within and outside government. As the authors of the
Arab Human Development Report 2004 noted: “There
are some media outlets that are little more than mouthpieces
for government propaganda, promoting freedom of speech only
if it does not turn into political activity. Such captive outlets
fail to stimulate intelligent and objective debate, enhance
knowledge acquisition, and advance human development among the
public at large.”(29) Without the advancement of debate
and enhancement of knowledge to which new media can make substantive
contributions, prospects for democracy will weaken. For those
contributions to be meaningful, all involved in the information
process—from the individual blogger to the big media corporation—must
retain independence. Government pressure is inevitable but it
must be resisted if the democratic process is to gain a foothold.
These issues
raise many complex questions that have few precise answers.
New media’s role in progressive political change is hard
to define with certainty because the path toward democratization
remains uncharted. Those who move in that general direction
do so with more faith than certainty. They may get there, and
their chances of doing so will certainly be affected by the
ongoing evolution of new media in Middle Eastern societies.
Philip Seib is the Lucius W. Nieman Professor
of Journalism at Marquette University. He is the author of The
Global Journalist, Beyond the Front Lines, and other books.
NOTES
1. Mohamed Zayani, “Introduction—Al Jazeera and
the Vicissitudes of the New Arab Mediascape,” in Mohamed
Zayani (ed.), The Al Jazeera Phenomenon (Boulder, CO:
Paradigm, 2005), 33.
2. Marc Lynch, “Assessing the Democratizing Power of Satellite
TV,” TBS Journal 14, spring 2005.
3. Bernard Lewis, “Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle
East, Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 3, May/June 2005,
46.
4. Steve Coll, “In the Gulf, Dissidence Goes Digital,”
Washington Post, March 29, 2005.
5. David Crawford, “Battle for Ears and Minds: As Technology
Gives New Voice to Dissent, a Saudi Vies To Be Heard,”
Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2004, A 14; John Bradley,
Saudi Arabia Exposed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 193-95.
6. “Mass Media, Press Freedom and Publishing in the Arab
World: Arab Intellectuals Speak Out,” United Nations news
release re Arab Human Development Report 2003, October
20, 2003.
7. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Will the Mideast Bloom?”
Washington Post, March 13, 2005.
8. Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed
Regimes (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2003), 150.
9. Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era (New
York: Knopf, 2002), 106.
10. United Nations Development Program, Arab Human Development
Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society, (New York: United
Nations Publications, 2003), 63.
11. www.isu.net.sa.
12. Susan B. Glasser and Steve Coll, “The Web as Weapon,”
Washington Post, August 9, 2005, A 1.
13. Nicholas Watt and Leo Cendrowicz, “Brussels Calls
for Media Code to Avoid Aiding Terrorists,” Guardian,
September 21, 2005.
14. Madeleine K. Albright and Vin Weber, In Support of Arab
Democracy: Why and How (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
2005), 30.
15. Cathy Hong, “New Political Tool: Text Messaging,”
USA Today, June 30, 2005.
16. Coll, “In the Gulf, Dissidence Goes Digital.”
17. Arab Human Development Report 2003, 64.
18. Hugh Miles, Al-Jazeera (New York: Grove: 2005),
327, 328.
19. Zayani, “Introduction,” 35.
20. Marc Lynch, “Watching Al Jazeera,” Wilson
Quarterly, summer 2005, 44.
21. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 328.
22. Jon Alterman, “The Information Revolution and the
Middle East,” in Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman, eds.,
The Future Security Environment in the Middle East
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 243.
23. United Nations Development Program, Arab Human Development
Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World (New York:
United Nations Publications, 2005), 22.
24. “A World Through Their Eyes,” The Economist,
February 26, 2005, 24.
25. Hassan Fattah, “Voting, Not Violence, Is the Big Story
on Arab TV,” New York Times, January 30, 2005.
26. Arab Advisors Group, “48 Percent of Households in
Cairo Use the Internet and 46 Percent Have Satellite TV,”
news release, January 26, 2005.
27. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 151.
28. Alterman, “The Information Revolution and the Middle
East,” 244.
29. Arab Human Development Report 2004, 65.
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